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The article reviews the literature on economic development, critiques 
neoliberal economic theories, and advances the theory of infant industry promotion 
as an alternative model for development in Africa. The essay argues that for 
developing countries to catch up to developed countries requires contextualizing 
development theory, applying selective economic policies to industries where 
productive capacities can be developed, and localizing the policy lessons to develop 
the  productive abilities of local industries.  The role of state in development and 
implementation of protective measures such as tariffs, import bans on key raw 
materials, and rebates on industrial inputs is discussed. To escape the Resource 
Curse, African states will have to develop an alternative source of employment, an 
industrial base, and strengthen the productive powers of infant industries if those 
industries are to survive fierce international competition. To be durable in the 
African context, economic policy must reflect local conditions, vary from one 
historical context to the next, use readily available resources, and adequately 
respond to local problems. 
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When assessing key economic, social, and political indicators in Africa, the 
last fifty years signal general disappointment.  A persistent problem facing African 
countries is political violence, which undermines reform of all sorts and stifles 
economic development across sectors.  While political violence is the main factor 
that accounts for the disintegration of African society, the unraveling of the social 
fabric and the death of millions of people is traceable to underdevelopment.   
The fight against poverty in its many forms (e.g. persistent malnutrition, 
numerous pandemics, untreated but curable diseases, and chronic economic 
problems) has shaped how policy is enacted and has transformed the fate of many 
societies around the world.   
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How does one explain the persistent lack of development on the continent? 
By analyzing the approach to development through Infant Industry Promotion, this 
essay observes how today’s rich countries developed and how that model can be 
replicated.2   
In navigating the different theories of economic development, I will show 
the limits of neoliberal theories of growth and argue that we must pay attention to 
the history of economics, focusing on policies adopted by today’s rich countries.  
Next, I will argue that no single school of economic thought can help African 
countries develop. The key lies in contextualizing development theory, applying 
selective policy to industries where productive capacities can be developed, and 
drawing relevant lessons from diverse schools of thought around the world.  
Localizing the methodology prioritizes local industries and thus develops their 
competitiveness. Lastly, lessons will be drawn to help African countries learn from 
successful ‘catch ups’ and effective economic policies successfully implemented by 
today’s developed countries.3 In the next section, I explore the question of 
development in the African context. I begin my analysis with the problem of 
underdevelopment in the African context. 
Underdevelopment is related to – yet, distinct from - the problem of 
violence. This is mostly so because interstate violence has been significantly dropped 
over the past five decades (Peter, 2001; Themnér & Wallensteen, 2011).  Violence, 
specifically civil wars and intra-state conflicts, poses the greatest threat to peace and 
the socioeconomic wellbeing of the people of Africa (Geneva Declaration 
Secretariat, 2008, pp. 2-3, 13).  
On the other hand, ethnic violence has proliferated, costing the lives of 
millions of people.  The gap between the fall of interstate violence and the rise ethnic 
violence raises several questions.  What accounts for the underdevelopment of 
countries that have been relatively stable, without war or internal ethnic conflicts? 
What explains the widening inequality between the Global North and South (Erik S  
Reinert, 2007), the ‘haves’ and ‘have not’s’?  
To borrow a phrase popularized by the British poet Percy Bysshe Shelley in 
A Defense of Poetry (1954), around the world the “rich have become richer, and the 
poor have become poorer.” Underdevelopment leads to poverty, which deprives 
people of the means to live decent lives.  Oftentimes, when underdevelopment and 
poverty in Africa become too great to bear, competition over scarce resources leads 
to violent outbreaks, costing the lives of many.   
Infant Industry Promotion is a term that refers to a state policy that for a 
period of time shields domestic industries in order to prepare them for competition 
with more established firms.  This approach is characterized by a series of policies 
designed to nurture domestic industry until those industries develop “productive 
powers”(Brown, Lynn-Jones, & Miller, 1995, p. 54) and are able to compete globally.  
Implementing Infant Industry Promotion involves prioritizing industries 
identified by the state as crucial to a country’s economic future and by enacting 
regulations to protect those industries during the infant stage of development. The 
removal of protective measures (e.g. tariffs, subsidies, quotas, import bans, rebates 
on industrial inputs, regulations, and product standards) fosters the capability of 
domestic industries to compete locally, regionally and internationally. The process 
can require months or years, depending on the nature of the industry and the 
intensity of competition. 
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2. Economic Growth in Africa: A Short Review 
 
In his lecture to the African Development Bank in 2009, Chang showed 
economic growth statistics between 1960-1980 and 1980-2004 on GDP growth rates 
(%) for sub-Saharan Africa as a region.  He contrasted that with two other regions: 
all developed countries, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean (Table 1). Sub-
Saharan Africa had the lowest growth rate compared with all other regions from 
1960 to 2004.  
These figures were reported in 1989 by The United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA) in a published report that showed the annual 
growth rate (GDP) for the continent was 0.4 percent between 1980 and 1987. 
Furthermore, the per-capital income at the end of the 1970s continuously declined at 
a rate of 2.6 percent annually during the same period (UNECA, 1989, p. i). The 
report noted that while poverty was increasing, “productive and infrastructural 
facilities” (UNECA, p. i) were decaying. Two decades later UNECA published new 
statistics on the grow rate across regions in Africa (see Table 2 for summary). 
At first it seems African economies have indeed picked up speed and joined 
the ranks of other developing countries. The report however identified the source of 
growth in the surge in commodity price between 2005 and 2007 and increased 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the extractive industries. Both commodities and 
natural resources are industries that suffer from diminishing returns over time. This 
will be discussed later in this paper. It showed that Central and Southern Africa are 
the most affected regions. Historically, these two regions have had weaker economic 
institutions.  
The sudden surge in GDP across regions was misleading because it was not 
reflective of any sustainable trend that transforms the economy of a country. The 
result was that when the financial crisis of 2008 hit, most of those countries went 
into a severe recession and numbers fell to historic lows. 
 
Table 1. Annual per capita GDP growth rates (%) 
 
Regions 
‘Bad Old Days’ 
1960-80 
(%) 
‘Brave New World’ 
1980-2004 
(%) 
All developing countries 3.0 2.2 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
3.1 0.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.6 -0.3 
Source: Table reproduced from The lecture delivered in the Eminent Speakers 
Program of the African Development Bank on 26 February 2009 (H. J. Chang, p. 2). 
Chang reproduced the table from World Development Report 2002(World Bank, p. 
237).  
 
Table 2: Real GDP growth (%) 
 






5.9 5.9 6.0 4.9 1.6 4.3 
Central 5.0 2.6 5.6 4.5 0.9 3.8 
East 7.4 6.8 7.5 6.4 3.9 5.3 
North 6.0 5.9 5.3 4.7 3.5 4.1 
Southern 6.0 6.6 6.7 4.6 -1.6 4.1 








4.9 5.9 5.1 4.2 0.5 3.6 
Source: The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2010 (UNECA, p. 
135, see Table 4.7) 
 
3. Making Sense of Underdevelopment 
 
There is a wide consensus that the problem of underdevelopment in the 
African context is related to the mode of production imposed from outside. It is also 
argued that Africa’s mode of integration into the global economy is responsible for 
its underdevelopment (Amin, 1972; Rodney, 1972). One group of scholars argues 
that the conditionality imposed by World Bank (WB)4 and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) is responsible for the underdevelopment of African economies (Amin, 
2010b; Easterly, 2001; Goldstein & Montiel, 2007). Others claim that the problem 
lies with the mode of production and capitalist system (Amin, 1990; Arrighi, 2007).  
Those who locate the cause in the capitalist system explain that the outgrowth of the 
capitalist produces such problems as “racism, sexism, imperialism, militarism, 
alienation, system environmental destruction, and the glaringly unequal distribution 
of wealth, incomes and political power” (Hunt, 2003; Wise, 1973).  
Another view that explains the fate of the poor is offered by the Malthusian 
school of economics, reasoning that poor people are to be blamed for poverty 
because they have too many children. This view is still popular in the explanation of 
poverty, not only in developing countries but also in the United States where some 
claim that African Americans and Hispanics have too many children (Hunt, 2003, p. 
51).  Political scientists also point to the institutional legacy of colonialism as the 
main culprit in the impoverishment of the continent, exemplified by exploitative and 
unequal relations in Africa’s rural sides, starting in the late 19th century and extending 
to the late 20th century (Amin, 1972; Mamdani, 1986; Rodney, 1972).  
Marxist theories contributed to this commentary, focused on the relations of 
exchange, modes of production, and class struggles.  Still, faced with the problem of 
mass violence in the postcolonial period, neither political economics nor Marxists 
could make sense of the violence.  Postcolonial violence is not driven by market-
based relationships. In other words, it is not the result of a clash between classes or 
division of labor. This fact withstood the attempted explanations of all political 
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economists.  It could be partially explained by Marxist scholars. Marxists succeeded 
in “historicizing the political legacy of colonialism and the colonial state as 
legal/institutional complex that reproduced particular political identities” (Mahmood 
Mamdani, 2005, p. 3). 
Neoliberal economists empowered and driven by  with their faith in perfect 
competition, equilibrium, and the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Malkiel, 2003) have 
pushed for the liberalization of markets, the removal of state planning from 
economic policy, deregulation of financial markets, and reduction of industrial tariffs.  
Africa’s leading political economist, Samir Amin, recently pointed out that neoliberal 
economists do not ask the real question about the system that governs the world 
today: capitalism. Rather, they religiously trust  the efficiency of the market and 
textbooks on economics are, therefore, “quasi-fundamental religious texts” (Amin, 
2011). Blind to the limits of the market hypothesis and its many flaws (Hunt, 2003), 
they provide an a priori response to explain  that the market already exists, therefore, 
it is rational and efficient. Unfortunately, this paradigm has proved disastrous for the 
countries of the South.  
The economic laws that govern firms also govern nations. In allocating 
resources to one sector you forego allocation to another. In times of crisis, war, and 
conflict, a country preoccupies itself less with building industries for civilians’ goods 
than with industries that support the war effort. 
A plethora of scholarship exists that examines the plunder of resources 
within the African continent (Amin, 2010a; Bond, 2006, see Ch. 4; Hochschild, 
2001).  Under colonial domination, both the economies and labor force of Africa 
were organized in such a fashion that all surpluses were extracted and exported to 
Europe (Jones, 2003, p. 42). Amin recently remarked that of all regions in the world, 
Africa remains the most vulnerable part of the global system and by this logic, is 
condemned to perpetual exploitation (Amin, 2010a). The Development Centre of 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development for the OECD on 
the history of world development showed in its historical analysis of world economy 
that: 
 
“Africa has nearly 13 per cent of world population, but only 3 per cent of 
world GDP. It is the world’s poorest region, with a 1998 per capita income 
only 5 per cent of that in the richest region, less than half of that in Asia 
(excluding Japan). It has the lowest life expectation (52 years compared with 
78 in Western Europe) (Maddison, 2001, p. 161).  
 
 From this perspective, a “useful Africa is an Africa without Africans. For the 
global system, the African people are too much” (Amin, 2010a). Given the desperate 
conditions existing for the people of Africa, it is no surprise that the postcolonial 
period has been ravaged by a proliferation of ethnic violence, civil wars, and 
genocides. The easiest way to weaken it is to exploit a divided and dismembered 
continent.  So reported the Ghanaian writer, Ayi Armah, in his article on the 
fragmentation of the African continent (Armah, 2010).   Locating Africa’s problem 
in its lack of integration has inspired the African Union to call for the unification of 
markets as a way to strengthen Africa’s position on the international stage.   
 The issue of uniting the countries of Africa was the subject of the Africa 
Union’s Summit in January 2011, under the theme of "Towards Greater Unity and 
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Integration through Shared Values" (AU, 2011).  Today, the leading institutions in 
Africa - African Union, The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA), and the African Development Bank (A.D.B.) have entire divisions 
dealing with the chronic problem of underdevelopment on the continent (Shaaeldin, 
1991, p. 328). 
The unification of various markets in Africa is seen as a prerequisite to the 
strengthening of the continent as a whole.  A stronger Africa will develop the ability 
to restrain “external plunder” (Amin, 2010a; Bond, 2006, pp. 45-46), and utilize its 
resources for the benefit of the African peoples.  Those who have control over 
global capital may well be advantaged by Africa remaining in darkness and its society 
perpetually fragmented. In disunity, Africa can be greedily exploited. Lacking in 
capability and sovereignty over territory and people, African states are easily 
subjugated politically and economically to the will of the dominant West.  
The next section discusses the theory of comparative advantage and 
problematizes it to show its limits. The last section concludes by discussing one 
alternative model in the theory of infant industry promotion. 
 
4. The Theory of Comparative Advantage and its 
Assumptions 
 
The theory of comparative advantage is the most important concept in 
international trade theory.  Common reasons advanced for trade include differences 
in natural resource endowment, differences in technological capabilities, and 
differences in demand. Some countries have more rare minerals than others.  Other 
countries have developed and pioneered technological innovation; others have 
unique demands for goods and services. Lastly, the existence of economies of scale 
in production delivers countries with more mature industries an advantage in a trade 
relationship superior to operating in self-sufficiency (Suranovic, 2010, p. 35). The 
economic theory of comparative advantage is based on relative production costs 
across countries.  
The theory offers a powerful tool for those engaged in international trade. 
However, it is grounded, like any economic theory, in a set of assumptions.  The 
countries involved produce using one factor of production. Other factors of 
production are omitted from the assumption. It infers that goods are homogeneous 
across firms and countries; labor is homogeneous within a country but 
heterogeneous across nations. Labor is always fully employed in the model of 
comparative advantage while goods and services move easily and cheaply across 
countries and between countries.  The model presumes a perfectly competitive 
market. Lastly, the level of technology utilized in production of goods and services is 
the only factor presupposed to vary across countries and industries (Suranovic 2010, 
39-45). 
The real world shows a different picture; one that is more complicated than 
the Ricardian model. The real world has politics to which economics is subordinated. 
In the real world of trade, many countries are involved, not just two, and they 
produce a variety of goods and services that are not homogeneous. The market is 
not perfectly competitive, since great differences exist among firms that enjoy power 
in certain markets and in certain industries.  
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Add to this complication the truth that some governments purposefully 
create and sustain monopolies that only generate market failures and not a 
competitive market (Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1989). Countries have monopolies that 
effectively prevent entries into the industry. Worse still, some countries have firms 
that set prices for goods and services at the expense of the price set by the assumed 
competitive market economy.  
Despite these flaws, the theory remains the most important and powerful in 
explaining normative trade. I say normative because a world of differences exist 
between how trade should be conducted according to the model and how trade is 
conducted. The theory does not describe how nations actually engage in trade but 
rather explains how trade can happen in the real world. It remains the bedrock of 
international trade as a conceptual framework.  
 
5. Comparative Advantage and Specialization 
 
The United Nations defines trade broadly as the inward and outward 
movement of goods through a country or territory (United Nations, 1998, p. 23). 
This definition includes movements through customs, warehouses and free zones. 
The theory of comparative advantage postulates that countries should specialize in 
the products they can most cheaply manufacture relative to other goods. 
Comparative advantage also shows that trade benefits both parties even 
when one country has an absolute advantage in certain industries.  The reason 
pertains to specializing in product where a country has the greatest relative advantage 
over its trading partner. The country that lacks a comparative advantage in a given 
industry can also benefit from trading with other nations by specializing in products 
that present a relative advantage. This conceptual framework was first elucidated by 
David Ricardo, and provides the theoretical foundation for 19th century free trade. 
Chang Ha-Joon, Economist and faculty member at University of Cambridge, 
argues that the theory of comparative advantage is correct only within a very narrow 
scope (H.-J. Chang, 2008, pp. 46-47). It assumes as a starting point: that nations will 
accept current levels of technology as a given.  Technology refers to the techniques 
used to turn resources (labor, capital, and land) into outputs (goods and services). 
Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage is a powerful tool for explaining how 
trade benefits a nation, but is not a good theory for explaining what happens when a 
country wants to acquire advanced technologies.5 
Chang argues that absorbing new technologies takes time. For countries that 
do not have a technological edge but seek to acquire it, protection from international 
competition is essential during the learning and implementation period. The problem 
lies in the opportunity cost involved in adopting a protectionist stance while 
domestic industries get ready for competition with the external world. The cost that 
a country must bear is often too heavy as that country must forego the opportunity 
to import cheaper products during the learning phase under protectionism.  Without 
great sacrifice, a country cannot develop an advance industrial base capable of 
competing on the international stage. The advocates of trade under neoliberalism 
argue that in order to achieve greater production and higher standards of living, 
countries need specialize in areas where those countries have a comparative 
advantage. This enables nations to concentrate on a limited number of activities in 
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order to increase economic efficiency.  Some countries have an absolute advantage 
or a comparative advantage in production. Reinert accused proponents of trade who 
recommend specialization in areas that offer a comparative advantage of misleading 
Third World Countries specializing “in being poor and uneducated” (Erik S Reinert, 
2005, p. 16). Instead he recommends a shift away from a focus on industries that 
suffer from diminishing return. Economic policies should seek to change “the 
economic structures of poor countries. This includes an emphasis on “scale, scope, 
speed and specialization” (Erik S Reinert, p. 16).  This means that countries seeking 
to develop need to focus their limited resources on developing the productive 
powers of key domestic industries. This is represents a shift from trade to 
production as a guiding principle. 
As discussed earlier, trade can benefit even countries that have an absolute 
advantage in a certain industry Absolute advantage is defined as the ability to produce 
goods or services at lower cost or with higher productivity. The reason trade can 
benefit a country that has no absolute advantage lies in the ability to produce a good 
or service using fewer resources than other producers use. For both countries 
engaged in the trade, having a smaller opportunity cost than others can lead to higher 
relative productivity. Once the comparative advantage is determined, then each 
country can focus on what it produces using the least resources. The outcome of this 
process of specialization is an increase in the total production of goods and services. 
This exchange then leads to higher living standards rather than self-sufficiency. This 
is the heart of the theory of comparative advantage.  
From Hamilton to List, all the way to today’s economists, the theory of 
comparative advantage has been criticized for failing to lift countries that seek to 
develop infant industries.  In Germany, the leading critic of international trade and 
advocate of infant industry promotion was Georg Friedrich List (1789-1846).  In 
List’s seminal work, The National System of Political Economy (List, 1991, published in 
1838), he argued that it was the responsibility of a nation to develop its “productive 
powers.” According to List, it was better for a state at the intermediate level of 
development to “protect only those infant industries that have a fair chance of 
achieving a comparative advantage” (Waltz, 1993, p. 56).  List criticized those who 
slavishly followed the school of ‘Free Trader,’ who took at face value the teachings 
of Adam Smith and David Ricardo and likened them to "the patient who followed a 
printed prescription and died of a misprint”(Brown et al., 1995, p. 54; Hirst, 1909, p. 
289). 
List also showed that the practice advocated by Great Britain, the 19th 
century power and later by the United States, amounted to a deliberate act of 
“kicking away the ladder”6 which allowed other countries to climb to the top. This 
deliberate act of sabotaging developing countries’ opportunity to use same 
mechanism effectively denied poorer countries the chance to develop (H.-J. Chang, 
2005). 
For the Americans, List advised that “the worst of all things" (Hirst, 1909) 
would be for farmers in America to buy their manufactured goods from England. 
The United States needed to protect its Infant Industries from competition, a vision 
that Alexander Hamilton vigorously advocated.  
Another contribution for the promotion of infant industries comes from 
Norwegian economic theorist Erik Reinert, professor of Technology Governance 
and Development Strategies at Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia. Reinert 
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argues that the priority in development economics is located on the wrong 
objectives. Large emphasis rests on foreign financing of domestic social goals rather 
than building industries and capacities to stimulate growth.  Rather than attacking the 
roots of the problem, the West attacks symptoms.  This has led to the retardation of 
development, strangulation of infant industries, and  “welfare colonialism” (Erik S 
Reinert, 2005).  
Drawing from examples in Europe, the U.S., South America, and Africa, 
Reinert shows that the Marshall Plan was only successful because it placed an 
emphasis on re-industrializing Germany. This is contrasted with the massive failure 
of the Morgenthau Plan which focused on de-industrializing Germany (G. C. 
Marshall, 1997a). The Morgenthau Plan is what the West regularly imposes on all 
other developing countries rather than adopting a plan similar to the Marshall Plan. 
Reinert writes that we need to return to economics as historically practiced because 
the model it offered was the best model for releasing countries from poverty. 
Development efforts based on the dominant paradigm, which has abandoned the 
long tradition of economics dating back to the 1400s onward, ignored history and 
turned development economics into palliative economics.   
The importance of history in the study of economics is necessary if one is to 
know what has been successful in the past.  Columbia University’s Nobel winning 
economist Joseph Stiglitz made a similar observation in a keynote address to the 
First Global Development Network in Bonn in 1999.  Stiglitz noted that success in 
meeting the challenges of the new century will depend on an accurate understanding 
of the histories of, “how we-the developed and developing countries, and the 
economies in transition-came to be where we are today” (J.E. Stiglitz & Chang, 2001, 
p. 194).   This point is elaborated in great detail by Reinert, who traces the history of 
the discipline of economics and notes that the praxis of development economics has 
always been “to assimilate and produce less efficient copies of the economic 
structure of wealthy nation” (Erik S  Reinert, 2007).  
To duplicate imperfectly economic structures of wealthy nation requires two 
factors: large division of labor and diversity in industries with increasing return 
activities, such as knowledge-intensive services. Most of today’s poor countries lack a 
strong manufacturing sector because the West has convinced them of, or imposed 
upon them, the need to focus on comparative advantage. The effect is what Reinert 
calls “industricide,” the killing of industries at the infant stage, reducing the country to 
an exporter of raw material and net importer of manufactured goods. Rich countries 
have focused on manufacturing and knowledge-intensive sectors while allocating raw 
material extraction to developing countries. The effect has been a sustained system 
whereby the rich get richer and the poor are made poorer. 
 
6. Increasing and Diminishing Returns 
 
The concept of diminishing and increasing returns dates back to the 
European Renaissance and finds expression in the writings of many economists 
including Friedrich List (1865), Alfred Marshall (1890), and in American statements 
attributed to policymakers such as Abraham Lincoln and Alexander Hamilton (Erik 
S Reinert, 2005).  These concepts are rooted in economic theory that leads to growth 
or lack thereof.  
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A successful economic policy must distinguish between “diminishing return 
industries, where specialization increases unit costs, and increasing return industries, where 
specialisation decreases unit costs” (E.S. Reinert, 2004, p. 162).  Marshall, author of the 
celebrated Principles of Economics (1890), recognized that a country has to subsidize 
industries where its industries are subjected to a dynamic of increasing return. 
Moreover, an economic policy that favoured increasing returns also needed to tax 
industries subject to decreasing returns (E.S. Reinert, 2004, p. 163).  Agriculture and 
extractive industries are industries subject to decreasing returns.  Manufacturing and 
technological sectors are examples of types of industries that are often subject to the 
dynamic of increasing returns. These easily reveal the Schumpeterian notion of 
“creative destruction.” (H. Reinert, 2006). 
According to Erik Reinert7 diminishing returns occurs in economic activities 
where “one factor of production is held constant, while the other factors of 
production are expanded. As a consequence of the one factor being held constant, 
the increased input of the other factors yields less and less benefit”.8  With 
diminishing returns, specialization increases unit costs. Specialization in increasing 
returns activities decreases unit cost as volume increases. It also increases labor 
productivity and per capita income. Diminishing return activities on the other hand 
place emphasis on perfect competition and the pursuit for market equilibrium. 
Increasing return activities emphasize the dynamic of imperfect9 competition that 
leads to growth. 
World history shows the absolute lack of countries that have done well vis-á 
vis what Alfred Marshall called the dynamic of diminishing returns (A. Marshall, 
1890).  Rather, successful cases of catch-up in the past have been achieved through a 
series of protective measures, selective policy favoring increasing return activities 
while taxing diminishing return activities.  
As an historical example, Reinert points to the reindustrialization of post- 
World War II Germany as the most successful example of wealth creation built on 
the distinction between diminishing return and increasing return. Reinert contends 
that the distinction between these two terms and their implication in economic 
policy account for the development of countries.  
In 1947 after the realization that the Morgenthau Plan had failed, then 
Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, announced its replacement with what became 
known as the Marshall Plan. Marshall outlined the contour of his plan in his Harvard 
Address (G. C. Marshall, 1997b).  There, he noted that “the farmer has always 
produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of 
life. This division of labour, was at the present time…threatened with 
breakdown”(G. C. Marshall, 1997b, p. 160). The distinction between urban and rural, 
the countryside and the city is one between two sectors: one based on agriculture and 
the other on industries that focus on manufacturing. The distinction is neat. It is one 
between industries that specialize in decreasing returns (e.g. extractive industries and 
agriculture) and those that specialize in increasing returns (e.g. industries that focus 
on manufacturing requiring innovation and constant technological advancement).  
While the Morgenthau Plan called for a dismantling of industries in Germany 
the Marshall Plan called for rebuilding German industries. The two approaches to 
developing Germany reflected the differences between decreasing and increasing 
return.  The former called for a focus on agriculture, the latter for a focus on 
industries. The first opted for a focus on an area where there was decreasing return 
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while the second prioritized industries that yielded increasing return over time. The 
focus of the Marshall Plan on was industry and returning industrial production back 
to the 1936 level which was deemed normal (E.S. Reinert, 2004, p. 158). 
The neoliberal paradigm places a strong emphasis on the individual, market 
equilibrium with perfect competition, and ignores the evolutionary dynamic of 
economic growth, along with the history behind growth as seen in developed 
countries. In the developing world today, Reinert has called the problem plaguing 
African countries “The Triple Curse” (Erik S Reinert, 1996). This includes religious 
adherence to diminishing return activities, emphasis on perfect competition, and 
pursuit for market equilibrium and massive exposure to erratic price volatility. Taken 
together, these factors lead to vicious cycles of poverty and unsustainable growth.  
While economic growth was achieved and developed through what Reinert 
calls the dynamic of imperfect competition, rich countries today are the strongest 
advocates for the exact opposite for developing countries. Their prescriptions have 
acquired a ‘quasi-fundamental religious’ acceptance: Free Trade, deregulation of the 
financial market, and a near sacred adherence to the Efficient Market Hypothesis.   
Developing countries must pay special attention to how today’s rich 
countries became rich and avoid listening to self-proclaimed narratives or myths of 
how they became rich. How do African countries avoid the propensity to specialize 
in activities that only produce Diminishing Returns? What is the way to escape the 
Triple Curse? What must be done to get Africa moving forward and develop industry 
competitiveness? The answer is offered by Reinert in an alternative source of 
employment, which will raise the standard of living, increase wage, and provide 
people with a viable means of support. This can be done by developing the industrial 
sector in a competitive local market. Even when this local market is inefficient by 
global standards, it proves far better than nothing.   Reliance on what is advocated by 
the Free Trade enthusiasts will only lead to dependence on raw materials and natural 
resources, which inevitably leads to a poverty trap (Erik S Reinert, 1996, p. 28).  
The international playing field is far from being level.  In the real world, 
some countries are far in the lead, others slag far behind. The outside expectation for 
African states is that they should be able to play with other states on the so called 
“equal playing field”. The reality however is far from this professed truth. In actuality 
the demand for African states to liberalize their markets, promote competition, and 
aim for market equilibrium is rather a call for African economies to remain 
committed to activities which are doomed to lead to what Marshall called the 
dynamic of diminishing returns.  
No country in the history of the world has done well focusing on 
diminishing returns. Every case in history points toward the dynamic of imperfect 
competition. All successful catch-up situations in the past have been achieved 
through a series of protective measures, selective policy favoring Increasing Return 
activities while taxing diminishing return activities. History teaches us that to break 
free from the bondage of underdevelopment; African states must prioritize certain 
industries, selective economic activities and develop the productive powers of those 
industries while they protect infant industries from external competition. This 
pattern does not exempt the industries from internal competition but protection 
from external competition is essential during the formative years.  This is one way 
that African economies can escape the trap of ‘Schumpeterian underdevelopment’ 
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(Erik S  Reinert, 2007, pp. 167-168) while promoting a system of even growth and 




For economic policy to be durable in the African context, it must reflect and 
respect local conditions. It must vary from one historical context to the next, use 
local resources, and respond adequately to local problems. A wholesale import of 
formulaic policy has proved disastrous over the past fifty years and will prove equally 
destructive in the future. Sustainable economic development requires first knowing 
the society in which one lives and knowing oneself as a people. It demands that 
research institutions within Africa produce knowledge to solve local problems within 
the continent. African states must learn lessons behind today’s developed countries. 
This requires focusing on actual economic policy rooted in the theory of Infant 
Industry Promotion. It requires that African countries put in place protective 
measures such as tariffs, subsidies, quotas, and import bans on key raw materials. 
It is important to select only industries that have the capacity to develop 
productive powers. The goal is to gradually remove barriers and protective measures 
as each industry develops the capacity to compete nationally, then regionally, and 
ultimately internationally.  Lastly, to get out of the Triple Curse, African states need to 
develop an alternative source of employment, an industrial base, and strengthen the 
productive powers of infant industries if those industries are to survive the fierceness 
of international competition.  All calls for deregulation of markets, removal of state 
planning from economic policy, reduction of industrial tariff, and liberalization of 
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